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Lender Liability Under a Workout
Agreement: A View Toward a More
Balanced Approach
I.

INTRODUCTION

The recent decline in the national economy has led to a substantial
increase in problem loans. Not only has industry suffered, but others,
such as the farmer and the small businessman have been affected. To
confront this problem, banks' and other lending institutions 2 have
been utilizing "workout agreements" to maximize their recovery of
the loan. A "workout agreement" is an out-of-court financial arrangement restructuring the debtor's business.' Typically in such an agreement the lender assumes operational control of the debtor's business. 4
This usually.occurs when a debtor encounters financial difficulty and
the creditor decides that it is in its best interest to try to maintain the
debtor's financial solvency without resorting to bankruptcy or foreclosure proceedings.5 However, these lending institutions' desire to
maximize recovery has led to an increasing number of lawsuits against
these same banking and lending institutions, with some staggering
results. 6 This comment's primary focus will be limited to problems
1. "A bank is an institution, usually incorporated, whose business is to receive
money on deposit, cash checks or drafts, discount commercial paper, make loans,
and issue promissory notes payable to bearer, known as bank notes." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 132 (5th ed. 1979).
2. This term would include "a loan company, a bank, or [savings] and loan
agencies." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 725 (3d ed. 1969). In addition, this term
has included thrift institutions such as mutual savings banks, savings and loan
associations, and credit unions. See J. NORTON & S. WMTLEY, BANKING LAW
MANUAL, Section 1.03[3] (1984).
3. For a more detailed analysis of workout procedures, see generally Practising
Law Institute, COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE SERIES COURSE HANDBOOK: BUSINESS
LOAN WORKOUTS 1987 (No. 309, 1987); Rosenberg, An Overview of Workouts From
the Perspective of the Institutional Lender, 16 Loy U. CIn. L.J. 1 (1984).
4. See supra note 3.
5. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 2.
6. "Security agreements may be avoided, claims may be subordinated to those
of other creditors, and most importantly, damages may be awarded for harm caused

by the lender's actions."
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infra note 19.
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inherent in lender liability under a workout agreement where the
lender has assumed control. This will be referred to as workout
liability. In addressing this problem, however, analogies will be drawn
from theories utilized in the field of lender liability in general.
Under a workout agreement, the lender is placed in an advantageous position over the borrower since this agreement is often offered
on a take it or leave it basis, and the lender ultimately has the ability
to control the daily operation of the debtor's business.' Although
some terms in these agreements may be beneficial to both parties (i.e.
further borrowing and spending) many of these agreements contain
provisions granting the lender extensive rights over the debtor's business. Typically by agreement, the lender is able to exert a substantial
amount of influence and control over the day to day operations of
the debtor. Indeed, the lending institution's desire for recovery may
become so strong that it resorts to illegal (or at least unethical) means
to maximize its recovery. The problem thus becomes, just how much
influence and control the lender may exert over a going concern
before it will incur substantial institutional liability. It is precisely this
issue with which the courts have been wrestling for years. After close
analysis, however, it becomes readily apparent that the courts have
been unable to adequately deal with the problem.' The courts' previous
attempts are either too vague for consistent application, or they are
too limited in application to handle the problem in a systematic and
uniform manner. 9 The problem with the present state of the law is
that it provides neither guidance nor uniformity. As a result, parties
who enter into a workout agreement have no way of ascertaining
what their respective rights and duties are under the agreement. A
theory of recovery is needed which is not only easily recognized and
applied, but is also capable of dealing with the entire lender-debtor
relationship under a work-out agreement. This comment suggests that
the exertion of control by a leader in a workout agreement should
result in the imposition of a fiduciary relationship at the onset of the
workout agreement. This will more than adequately accomplish the
goal of providing the certainty needed in this troubled field of law.
The goal of this comment is to ascertain just where and when
this fiduciary relationship should be imposed on the ordinary lender7. When a party enters into a workout agreement, it is usually because the
debtor is in serious financial trouble. This modified agreement is usually presented
to a borrower as an alternative to acceleration of the loan and as such, the borrower
has a choice to either acquiesce or face bankruptcy proceedings.
8. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 103-05 and accompanying text.
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debtor relationship. The comment will show why the imposition of a
fiduciary relationship at the onset of control by the lender is the most
equitable solution for all the parties to the workout agreement. To
reach this conclusion, however, it will first be necessary to discuss the
historical background of lender liability. This comment will then move
to an analysis of the recent expansion of liability including criticisms
thereof. This will be followed by a discussion of the fiduciary relationship in the lender-debtor workout situation as it stands today.
Finally, this comment will present what is its ultimate conclusion to
the problems inherent in the lender-debtor workout situation; that is
the imposition of a fiduciary relationship at the onset of lender
control.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY FOR LENDERS

Traditionally, lender liability cases have relied upon such tort
theories as fraud, 10 duress," interference with contractual relations, 2
10. Allensworth v. Ben Franklin Say. & Loan Ass'n., 71 111. App. 3d 1041,
389 N.E.2d 684 (2d Dist. 1979) (consumers brought action against savings and loan
association to recover damages for association's failure to make required disclosures

under Truth in Lending Act). See also Seefeldt v. Milliken Nat'l Bank of Decatur,
154 Ill. App. 3d 715, 506 N.E.2d 1052 (4th Dist. 1987) (purchasers of shares in real
estate development venture brought action against bank and sellers for fraudulently
inducing purchasers to assume position as guaraniors of corporate debt owed to
bank); Lee v. The Heights Bank, 112 Ill. App. 3d 987, 446 N.E.2d 248 (3d Dist.
1983) (action was brought for recovery of damages occasioned by fraud of bank
inducing cosigning of promissory note); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678
S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. 1984) (discussed at length herein; see infra text accompanying
notes 74-94); Commercial Nat'l Bank of Peoria v. F.D.I.C., 131 Ill. App. 3d 977,
476 N.E.2d 809 (3d Dist. 1985) (bank brought action against the F.D.I.C. based on
loans to third party alleged to have been fraudulently induced by a correspondent
bank for which the F.D.I.C. was receiver).
11. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. 1984)
(discussed at length herein; see infra text accompanying notes 74-94); Pecos Constr.
Co. v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 80 N.M. 680, 459 P.2d 842 (1969) (business duress and
compulsion). See also 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 1617 (3d ed. 1970) (Economic
duress [business coercion] may be evidenced by forcing a victim to choose between
distasteful and costly situations, i.e., bow to duress or face bankruptcy, loss of credit
rating, or loss of profits from a venture.)
12. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. of Mich., 108 Il1. App.
3d 212, 438 N.E.2d 1247 (3d Dist. 1982) (owners of building brought action against
lender to recover for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, fraud,
and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act);
Farley v. Kissel Co., 18 Ill. App. 3d 139, 310 N.E.2d 385 (1st Dist. 1974) (purchasers
of property brought action against lending institution for interference with contractual
relations); Fury Imports, Inc. v. Shakespeare Co., 554 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1977)
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misrepresentation, 3 bad faith,' 4 estoppel or waiver, 5 wrongful dishonor,' 6 and breach of fiduciary duty 7 in holding a lender accountable
(action for tortiously inducing supplier to breach contract with plaintiff); Peterson
v. First Nat'l Bank of Iowa, 392 N.W.2d 158 (Ia. App. 1986) (tenants brought action
against bank for intentional interference with existing and prospective contracts and
breach of oral contract after tenant's agricultural lease was terminated).
13. Central States Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F.2d 1405 (6th
Cir. 1984) (purchasers brought action against bank to recovet damages arising out
of misrepresentations made by bank vice-president with respect to financial stability
of bank's customer); Berkline Corp. v. Bank of Miss., 453 So. 2d 699 (1984) (creditor
brought action against bank charging that bank made material misrepresentations
regarding credit worthiness of one of its customers); Seneca Communications, Inc.
v. The International Bank of Cal., 103 Cal. App. 3d 541, 163 Cal. Rptr. 176.(2d
Dist. 1980) (action was brought against bank and vice-president of bank, alleging
that, in response to a telephone inquiry asking whether a certain depositor maintained
an account, the vice-president answered in the affirmative and made further misrepresentations as to the customer's balance and credit was extended upon reliance of
this information). But see Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289 (1983) (precluding recovery
under the FTCA for any claim arising out of misrepresentation). But see also 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h)(1982) (Title 28 provisions shall not apply to any claim arising out
of misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contractual rights).
14. K.M.C. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (borrower sued
lender for bad faith breach of financing agreement); Sahadi v. Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1983) (summary judgment was granted in
favor of a bank in action to recover damages for breach of loan agreement); Wagner
v. Venson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (4th Dist. 1980) (borrowers
brought action against bank for alleged negligence, bad faith and misrepresentation
in connection with borrowers' investment in cattle raising project offered by ranch);
Carrico v. Delp, 141 11. App. 3d 684, 490 N.E.2d 972 (4th Dist. 1986) (borrowers
brought action against bank for breach of line-of-credit agreement, malicious breach
of agreement [bad faith] and fraud).
15. National Farmers Inc. v. Kinsley Bank, 731 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1984)
(contract to loan customer money was enforceable, even though bank under Kansas
law could not legally lend customer the amount of money needed); Sahadi v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust, 706 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1983) (bank was estopped
from calling loan due based upon its past allowances of late payments); Westinghouse
Credit Corp. v. Shelton, 645 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1981) (assignee's acceptance of late
payments during course of the contract waived its right to strictly enforce contract's
time terms); Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1980)
(repossession was wrongful as a matter of law where creditor had accepted late
payments).
16. Raymer v. Bay State Nat'l Bank, 424 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. App. 1981) (bank
customer brought action against bank for wrongful dishonor of checks and for
violating statute against unfair and deceptive practices); Mercantile-Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Delp & Chapel Concrete & Constr. Co., 44 Md. App. 34, 408 A.2d
1043 (1979) (suit against bank to obtain damages for bank's alleged wrongful dishonor
of 12 checks as well as for alleged conversion of checking account funds); American
Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., v. Flick, 146 Ind. Ct. App. 122, 252 N.E.2d 839
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for unfairly calling a loan, or negligence in controlling the management decisions of a debtor in financial trouble. 18 One need only look

(1969) (action by debtor because of bank's errone6 us setoff and wrongful dishonorment of depositor's check); Schaffner v. Ehrman, 139 Ill. 109, 28 N.E. 917 (1891)
(bank customer had sufficient funds in account but bank error caused dishonor,
resulting in a suit for damages).
17. Verbaere v. Community Bank, 148 111. App. 3d 249, 498 N.E.2d 843 (1st
Dist. 1986) (bank's seizure of loan collateral without consent of borrowers held not
a breach of fiduciary duty by the bank); Farmer City State Bank v. Guingrich, 139
Ill. App. 3d 416, 487 N.E.2d 758 (4th Dist. 1985) (held that a fiduciary relationship
does not exist as a matter of law between a guarantor and a creditor); Bank Computer
v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 110 Ill. App. 3d 492, 442 N.E.2d 586 (1st Dist. 1982)
(fiduciary duty is created only when one party entrusts himself to domination and
control of another); McErlean v. Union Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 90 I11.App. 3d 1141,
414 N.E.2d 128 (1st Dist. 1980) (there is nothing inherent in business dealings between
lender and borrower from which springs a cognizable fiduciary relationship in absence
of facts of circumstances pleaded from which such a connection may be inferred).
18. In addition, claims have been made under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE.

For example, a claim may be made that a party violated his obligation of good faith
and fair dealing as required under U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987). Good faith is defined as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.". Id. at § 1-201(19) (1987).
Furthermore, a claim may be made under U.C.C. § 1-208, which in pertinent part
provides:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate
payment or performance or require collateral or additional collateral "at
will" or when he deems himself "insecure" or in words of similar import
shall be construed to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in
good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired.
The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom
the power has been exercised.
U.C.C. § 1-208 (1987). In addition one could-also make an estoppel argument under
§ 2-309(3), which states "[t]hat termination of a contract by one party, except on the
happening of an agreed upon event, requires that reasonable notification be received
by the other party and an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its
operation would be unconscionable." U.C.C. § 2-309(3)(1987).
A claim may also be brought under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, whereby
a creditor may be required to return property received in a preferential transfer. See
11 U.C.C. § 547(b)(1986). In addition, 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1982) provides that under
principles of equitable subordination, a court may subordinate for purposes of
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim.
See e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308 (1939) ("In the exercise of its equitable
jurisdiction the bankruptcy court has the power to sift the circumstances surrounding
any claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in administration of the
bankrupt estate.").
A cause of action may also be pursued under the federal securities laws. For
example, a lender may be liable as a controlling person under 15 U.S.C. § 77(o)
(1982) (Securities Act of 1933), and under 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1982) (Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a)). For a discussion of a controlling person's liability

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 8

at the growing number of claims and the size of the monetary awards
19
rendered to realize the potential of these causes of action. The
problem with these causes of action, however, is that they only provide
an after-the-fact analysis of what the parties rights and duties are
under the loan contracts. What at one time may have been thought
to be an acceptable procedure under a workout agreement may now
subject the lender to substantial liability. 20
The causes of action which a borrower may assert are wide and
varied. However, the courts are still employing new and expanded2 1
theories to provide the financially troubled debtor greater protection.
under the 1933 and 1934 acts, see T. HAZEN, THE LAw OF SECURiES REGULATION
207-08, 284 (1985); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 441-56 (1983).

There may also be a challenge under the tax and wage laws. A lender who finances
the payroll of its debtor may be liable under the Internal Revenue Code for failure
to collect and remit wage withholding taxes. See I.R.C. § 3505(a) (1982).
Finally, a claim may be brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982) (RICO). RICO provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such a person has participated as a principal
... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
Section 1963 imposes criminal sanctions while § 1964 may subject a lender to civil
liability. Id. at §§ 1963-1964. See generally Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to
Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775 nn.40-46 (1986) [hereinafter Ebke & Griffin]. Although these latter theories are somewhat novel, they are
beyond the scope of this article.
19. In what is probably the most widely publicized case of the day, Hunt v.
Banker's Trust Co., 646 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Tex. 1986), the plaintiffs claimed $13.8
billion in damages. Recently, a district court in Texas awarded $70 million against
MBank Abilene for claims arising from the lender's failure to fund a $3 million loan
commitment. See LeMaire v. MBank Abilene, No. 52,567 (D. Texas Aug. 12, 1986)
(LEXIS, Texas library Cases file). In an Ohio case, Dennis v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank,
No. 18738 (D. Ohio March 14, 1985) (West Law, Ohio library, Case file), the jury
awarded the Dennis family $1.04 million on a breach of fiduciary duty theory. In
addition, under certain circumstances, the lender may also be liable for substantial
punitive damages. See in Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 38 Cal. 3d 892, 910, 701
P.2d 826, 839 (1985), wherein the court affirmed a $1 million jury verdict against a
lender who was found to be guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.
20. See infra notes 60-73, 74-95 and accompanying text.
21. This is evidenced by judicial recognition of the fact that the common law
theories provided insufficient protection to cover certain lender-debtor misfortunes.
See infra notes 76-134 and accompanying text.
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The courts have apparently found that the traditional common law
theories of liability are not broad enough to encompass the entire
lender-debtor relationship. There are still situations in which the
debtor is not provided with adequate protection from overreaching
on the part of the lender. For example, in State National Bank v.
Farah Manufacturing Company,22 the court held that a debtor is
entitled to have its internal operations managed by loyal and competent directors. 23 Any interference with this right would be tortious. 24
In addition, the courts have expanded the common law theories of
bad faith, 2 estoppel, 26 and fiduciary relationship27 in an effort to
provide the debtor with greater protection. Finally, some courts have
implemented a "prima facie tort theory" as an attempt to fashion a
remedy covering the various problems inherent in the lender-debtor
relationship. 28
All of these theories are relevant to the workout situation as well.
By mere fact of their existence, it can be argued that the courts are
willing to accept that these are viable causes of action that may be
utilized in asserting liability of lending institutions. Whether they
relate to actions taken in the formation of the agreement or actions
taken after the inception of the relationships, all of the aforementioned theories are relevant and useful to solving problems under a
workout agreement. A look at these new and expanded theories of
liability is necessary to ascertain whether the courts have accomplished
the task of providing better protection or are merely falling into the
same trap as provided for by traditional theories, that trap being a
theory with limited application and guidance.

III.

RECENT EXPANSION OF LIABIITY

In recent years, dramatic changes have occurred in the evergrowing field of lender liability. 29 The courts, recognizing that the
traditional liability theories are inadequate to properly cover the many
problems that arise in a lender-debtor relationship, have been expanding the common law to protect the debtor from overreaching by the
22. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).

23. Id. at 690.
24. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 74-94.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 36-59.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 50-54.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 96-102.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 60-73.
29. Moss, Borrowers Fight Back With Lender Liability, 73 A.B.A.J. 64, 68
(March 1, 1987).
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lender. For example: (1) the courts have been expanding the theory
of bad faith to apply to various aspects of the lender-debtor relationship;30 (2) in an effort to fashion a remedy which would encompass
all situations, at least one court has looked to the "prima facie tort
3
theory", as provided for in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which simply holds that one is liable for any intentional harm caused
to another;3 2 (3) the tort of interference with contractual relations has
been applied to a situation where a bank interfered with a company's
internal operations33 (the court stated that the borrower was entitled
to have its affairs managed by competant directors and officers who
would maintain loyalty to the company34) and; (4) even though the
normal lender/debtor relationship is not governed by fiduciary principles, some courts have been increasingly willing to impose a fiduciary
duty if they find that the lender has exerted excessive influence and
control over the borrower.35 The following discussion will review these
newly expanded theories of liability.
A.

GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

Good faith is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." ' 36 A duty of good faith has been applied in
many different circumstances. For years it has been applied under (1)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts;3 7 (2) the Uniform Commercial
Code;' and (3) traditional tort law.3 9 The application of this duty by
the courts has greatly expanded the implied obligation of good faith
owed by the lender.
The increased use of the good faith theory as a viable option for
debtor recovery can be largely traced to the holding in K.M.C. Co.
v. Irving Trust. 4° In K.M.C., a borrower sued the lender for its bad
30. See infra notes 36-59 and accompanying text. See also K.M.C. Co. v. Irving
Trust, Inc., 757 F2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
31. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§

870 (1979).

32. Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
1984).

33. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.
34. Id. at 690.

35. See, e.g., Dennis v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank, No. 18738 (D. Ohio March 14,
1985) (West Law, Ohio library, Case file).
36. U.C.C. § 1-201 (1987).

37.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 205 (1981).

38. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987).
39. See Tyler, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability in Texas, 24 Hous. L.

REv. 411, 414 (1987).

40. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
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faith refusal to make advances under the previously existing line-ofcredit agreement.41 The borrower claimed the reason for the bank's
refusal to advance funds centered around a personality conflict and
not the borrower's financial trouble.4 2 The Sixth Circuit held that
even though a bank has a discretionary right to make advances, this
does not obviate the bank's implied obligation of good faith and fair
dealing as covered by the U.C.C. 43 which imposes a duty on the bank
to give notice before it discontinues financing." The result was that
the court upheld a $7.5 million jury award which included punitive

damages .41

This theory was also recognized in Carrico v. Delp,46 a recent
Illinois Appellate Court decision in which a borrower sued the lender
for breach of a line-of-credit agreement, malicious breach of agreement, and fraud. 47 In answer to the bank's claim that it had "total
discretion" as to whether or not any more money would be advanced,
the court said that "[g]ood faith between contracting parties requires
the party vested with contractual discretion to exercise it reasonably,
and he may not do so arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner
inconsistent with the reasonable expectation of the parties". 4 The
court concluded that the agreement gave the bank reasonable, not
49
absolute, discretion.
Lastly, in Sahidi v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
Co.,50 the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that under certain circumstances a lender may be precluded from exercising his contractual right to acceleration.51 The
court held that the banks continual acceptance of late payments had
established a course of dealing between the parties which in effect
had modified their previous agreement.5 2 The court held, as a matter
41. Id.
42. Id.

43. U.C.C. § 1-201 (1987).
44. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
45. Id.

46. 141 Ill. App. 3d 684, 490 N.E.2d 972 (4th Dist. 1986).
47. 141 Ill. App. 3d at 685-86, 490 N.E.2d at 973-74.
48. 141 Ill. App. 3d at 690, 490 N.E.2d at 976.
49. Id.

50. 706 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 197-98. The word acceleration, as used in this Comment, is in
reference to a clause in a loan contract, usually called an "acceleration clause," by
which the lender is given the right to hasten or advance the due date of the loan
because of some condition such as the failure to make payments when due, or when
the creditor deems itself "insecure."
52. Sahadi, 706 F.2d at 197.
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of law, that the borrower's failure to make an interest payment on
its due date was not a sufficient basis for the lender to accelerate the
loan." In order for the lender to re-establish its rights there would
have to be sufficient notice of its intent to no longer accept late
5 4
payments.
Thus, the courts appear to be willing, under certain circumstances, to recognize that a lending institution does have certain duties
and obligations which it owes to a debtor. By imposing the duty of
good faith and fair dealing on the lender the courts are, in effect,
recognizing that a lender has a duty to respect debtor's rights which
can be implied under the contract.
This could similarly be applied under a workout agreement. A
lender, like any party to a contract, has a duty of good faith and fair
dealing under a workout agreement. If a lender makes a managerial
decision or gives advice in bad faith, then the lender will incur
institutional liability. It makes no difference whether the parties were
under a workout agreement or a mere loan contract.
Even though the lender may have a valid legal interest in the
actions of the debtor, this interest is not absolute. Regardless of the
justifiable character of the actions taken, if the lender acts in bad
faith, i.e., does not respect the debtors rights and interests, the lender
will have violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing.55
Though somewhat analogous to the duty of a fiduciary, the duty
of good faith and fair dealing is more broadly conceived thus eluding
precise definition. 56 It is only with the aid of hindsight that the courts
are able to determine whether the lender has acted in bad faith. This
gives a lender and a debtor no idea of their respective rights and

53. Id.
54. Id. at 199.
55. Schott v. Glover, 109 Il. App. 3d 230, 440 N.E.2d 376 (1982) (plaintiff
can state a cause of action for tortious interference with contract against third party
who is conditionally privileged if plaintiff can set forth factual allegations from which
actual malice may reasonably be said to exist; however, such allegations would
necessarily include desire to harm, which is independent of and unrelated to any
desire to protect one's interests); Frank Coulson, Inc.-Buick v. G.M.C., 488 F.2d
202, 206 (5th Cir. 1974) (automobile dealer brought action against manufacturer for
damages for wrongfully forcing dealer to sell its assets and for maliciously interfering
with contractual negotiations between dealer and the dealership purchaser); Doremus
v. Hennesy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898), (defendants caused persons doing
business with plaintiff to cease doing so and as a result, plaintiff's business was
destroyed).
56. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 18, at 798.
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obligations. Moreover, this case-by-case analysis provides little if any

57
guidance for the lower courts to follow.
Despite the fact that good faith theory does provide some level
of protection to the debtor, it is generally only applicable to extreme

types of behavior which require the proof of intent to injure."
However, since it is immaterial whether or not the lenders reasons for
his actions were justified," the likelihood of success in asserting such

a cause of action is suspect and, as such, the theory of bad faith is
inadequate to deal with the problems associated with the workout
agreement.
B.

PRIMA FACIE TORT THEORY

Perhaps the most liberal attempt at defining lender liability is the

prima facie tort doctrine. Under the prima facie tort theory, one who

intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the

other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not
justifiable under the circumstances. 60 This liability may be imposed
although the actor's conduct does not come within a traditional

category of tort liability. 6' For example, in Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc.,62 the plaintiff prevailed in a cause of action predicated on
a prima facie tort theory. The jury found that that the defendant had
wrongfully "called in" a $900,000 secured demand note. During the
course of their dealings, the lender infoxmed the borrower that due

to the declining value of its collateral and coercion from bank

examiners, it would be necessary to discontinue the outstanding note
57. Id.

58. See

RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment (e)(1981).
59. The test of the good faith of the creditor is a subjective inquiry, looking
to the creditor's actual mental state. This is not negatived by a showing that there
was no basis for the creditor's belief. "In addition, it is immaterial whether or not
the information upon which the creditor based his determination was, in fact, true,
or whether the creditor was negligent in failing to examine whether or not it was
true." ANDERSON, UNWORM COMNERCLU CODE 462-63 (3d ed. 1981).
60. See Ebke & Griffin, supra note 18, at 799 n. 143 (citing Bandag of
Springfield, Inc. v. Bandag, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 546, 551-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (implicitly
adopting the prima facie tort doctrine in Missouri); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 870 and comments (1979); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in Missouri;
Commission of a Lawful Act With Intent to Injure May Result in Liability, 50
UMKC L. REv. 128, 129-38 (1981) for an in-depth discussion of the legal and
theoretical foundations of the prima facie tort doctrine.)
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 870 (1981).

62. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Co. App. 1985).
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after 60 days. 63 Contrary to these representations, however, the lender
continued to advance funds and cooperate with the debtor well past
the 60 day period.6 Shortly thereafter, the bank suddenly made a
formal demand for the note and two weeks later took possession of
the assets and accounts receivable of the debtor. 6 The jury found
that the lender's actions were motivated by an intent to injure and
returned a verdict against the lenders for over $7.5 million, consisting
of approximately $1.5 million in actual damages and $6 million in
punitive damages, which were later reduced to $3 million by the trial
court.6 Although the trial court was reversed by a Missouri Court of
Appeals 67 on the grounds that the lender's conduct was justified by
legitimate business interests to reduce losses resulting from high risk
loans, the appellate court did recognize the validity of this cause of
action. Along these same lines, a New York Appellate Court in
Luonomy Cars, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A ., 6 held that a valid business
justification may preclude liability under the prima facie tort doc69
trine.
While the prima facie tort theory has not had a profound effect,
it is evident that courts are searching for new ways to provide greater
protection to the debtor. This is important to the workout liability
situation because, if it could be proven that the lender initiated a
course of action in pursuit of intentionally running the debtor out of
business, the debtor will have established a cause of action. 70 The
problem once again, however, is in overcoming the business justification hurdle.
Although somewhat similar to the implied covenant of good
faith, this theory sounds only in tort law while the latter sounds in
both contract and tort law. 71 Their basic similarity lies in the problem
that they pose. Both theories require an after-the-fact analysis of the
actor's mental state under ill defined standards of law.7 1 One author
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

45.
46.
44.
55.

68. 65 A.D.2d 549, 408 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1978).
69. 65 A.D.2d at

-

, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 954.

70. RESTATEMENTS (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1981). See also Motif Const.
Corp. v. Buffulo Sav. Bank, 50 A.D.2d 718, - , 374 N.Y.S.2d 868, 870 (1975)
(valid business interest justified lender's action); Porter v. Crawford, 611 S.W.2d
265, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (same).
71. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 18, at 799.
72. Id.
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has suggested that "the prima facie tort theory, as well as the duty
of good faith and fair dealing, is merely 'a philosophical effort to
state all tort law in a single sentence rather than an effort to state a
meaningful principle.' ' '73
Indeed, what may have been an attempt to provide greater
protection may be ineffective due to lack of clarity. In order for a
business enterprise or lending institution to conduct its daily affairs
vis-a-vis its debtors, there must be certain guidelines for their actions.
Over-broad or poorly defined legal concepts such as bad faith and
prima facie tort liability, while providing some protection, do not
provide adequate guidelines for consistent applicat on and as such
have limited value in the land of lender liability.
C.

INTERFERENCE WITH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

In the landmark case, State NationalBank v. Farah Mfg. Co.,74
the court for the first time, recognized that a lender may be held
liable in tort for unjustified interference with the debtors corporate
governance. 75 This is now commonly referred to as "interference with
corporate governance. The factual background of this case is important because the criteria are present that this comment suggests should
result in the imposition of a fiduciary relationship. Specifically, under
an amended agreement, the lender was given the right to become
involved in the control of the debtor corporation. 76 To understand
the significance of this case and its importance to the field of lender
liability, a detailed discussion of the Farah case is warranted.
Farah Manufacturing Company (FMC) is a family owned apparel
manufacturer which began operations in 1919. After years of profitability, FMC experienced substantial setbacks in the mid-1970's due
in part to a labor dispute. 77 As a result, the FMC board of directors
replaced W illiam Farah, who had occupied that position for over 10
years, and named a new chief executive officer. 78 Shortly thereafter,
FMC's three lenders amended their loan agreement to include a
strengthened management change clause 79 which allowed the lenders
73. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 18, at 799 citing Dobbs, Tortious Interference
with ContractualRelationships, 34 ARK. L. RiEv. 335, 345 (1980).
74. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
75. Id. at 690.

76. Id. at 667.
77. Id.

78. The board elected William Leone to replace Farah as C.E.O. Id. at 667.

79. Id. at 667. This management change clause could be analogized to an
acceleration clause. See supra note 51.
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to declare a default if there occurred: "Any change in the office of
President and Chief Executive Officer of Farah [Manufacturing Company, Inc.] or any other change in the executive management of Farah
[Manufacturing Company, Inc.] which any two banks shall consider
for any reason whatsoever, to be adverse to the interest of the
Banks.,80
When it appeared to Farah that the new CEO was ruining the
company, Farah began his battle to win back control of FMC.8 ' The
lenders, however, informed FMC that Farah's reinstatement would
be unacceptable to them and that his election would constitute an
event warranting default under the modified agreement. 8 2 Having
learned of the lenders' further threats to call their loans, put the
company into bankruptcy, and padlock the doors if Farah was
reelected,83 Farah withdrew from the election.8 In fact, it subsequently
came to light that the lenders had no such intention. 5
Left with no other options, Farah began a long and difficult
proxy fight to regain control of the company before it would be
forced into bankruptcy.8 6 Although the lenders put up a fight, Farah
eventually won his battle and was elected as CEO.87 After the return
of Farah, the company made a complete turn around. Sales increased,
company's
as well as profits, and under Farah's new direction, the
8
former status in the apparel market has been restored.
In 1981, Farah Manufacturing Company filed suit against the
lenders for damages incurred during their period of control. The jury
found the lenders liable for fraud, duress and interference with
corporate governance and awarded FMC damages in the amount of
$18,947,348.77.89
The appellate court felt that the claim for fraud was supported
by the fact that the lenders threatened to accelerate the loan, when in
fact, no such decision had been made. 90 As to the issue of duress, the
80. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 667. In addition, under the new agreement, "the
lenders obtained a first lien security interest in FMC's equipment, real estate, and
machinery." Ebke & Griffin, supra note 18, at 778.
81. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 667, 670.
82. Id. at 668, 670.
83. Id. at 673-74.
84. Id. at 674.
85. Id. at 680.
86. Id. at 679.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 680.
89. Id. at 667.
90. Id. at 681-82.
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court held that "[a]cceleration clauses are not to be used offensively
such as for the commercial advantage of the creditor. They do not
permit acceleration where the facts make it unjust or oppressive." 91
With respect to the implementation of the more novel interference
theory, the Farah court held that a lender can commit the tort of
interference if the lender improperly interferes with the management
decisions of a borrower. 92 Commentators have suggested that "[ujnder
Farah's expansion of the interference theory, the establishment of a
specific contract or prospective contractual relationship does not seem
to be essential to an actionable claim for interference in a debtor's
corporate governance." 93 The lender's liability is to be based on its
tortious interference with the company's operation. The court found
that the borrower "was entitled to have its affairs managed by
competent directors and officers who would maintain a high degree
of undivided loyalty to the company. '" 94
The judicial recognition that a borrower is entitled to have its
affairs managed by competent directors and officers who will maintain
a high degree of undivided loyalty to the debtor company, not the
lender, acknowledges that the borrower's best interests must also be
taken into consideration. This is, in fact, arguably what the imposition
of a fiduciary relationship would provide. 9
D. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A cause of action claiming that a lender has violated a fiduciary
obligation has also been recognized of late. However, some courts
have been willing to accept this cause of action as a viable theory of
recovery while others have not. For example, in In re W. T. Grant
Co., 96 the Second Circuit held that a creditor is under no fiduciary
obligation to a debtor. However, the court did note that a lender
"would be derelict in its duty to its own creditors and stockholders"
if it did not monitor the debtor's activities. 97
It is often difficult to ascertain when a fiduciary duty will be
imposed upon a lender. In Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National
91. Id. at 685.

92. Id. at 690.

93.
94.
95.
dropped

Ebke & Griffin, supra note 18, at 788-89.

Farah, 678

S.W.2d at 690.

In fact, FMC in its original complaint pleaded such a cause of action but
same as their attorneys felt it was too complicated to attempt. See, Ebke

and Griffin, Supra note 18, at 779 n.120.

96. 4 Bankr. 53, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983).
97. 699 F.2d 599, 610 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 89 (1983).
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Distillers & Chemical Corp.,9s the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that if a debtor can show that a lender has assumed "actual participatory, total control of the debtor," and if the lender has taken
advantage of that control, the lender may be liable as a fiduciary. 99
Similarly, in In re American Lumber Co.,' °° a bankruptcy court held
that the bank had assumed a fiduciary obligation when it took
possession of the debtor's plant and exercised full control over its
cash disbursements. But in an Ohio case, Dennis v. BancOhio National
Bank,11 the court held that the bank assumed a fiduciary relationship
when it merely began to advise the Dennis family on how to run their
farm.
The problem with the courts' present day application of the
fiduciary relationship in the lender-debtor context is its strict adherence to the common law theory of control. In order for fiduciary
principles to apply, the level of control must approach total domination of the debtor by the lender.10 2 Moreover, the courts have failed
to provide a reliable test for determining what constitutes excessive
control. Thus once again, it is impossible for parties to know in
advance when they have surpassed this seemingly arbitrary level of
control. Accordingly, trial courts' simply apply an after-the-fact analysis.
E.

THE FAILURE OF THE PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS

Though the courts seem willing to deal with the problems associated with the lender-debtor relationship, after close analysis of the
previously discussed attempts, it is apparent that they have yet to
strike a balance between the lender's interest in repayment and the
problem of providing adequate protection to the debtor. The inadequacies of the common law theories of liability are exemplified by the
judicial recognition that there was a needed expansion to cover the
new and increasingly complex lender-debtor relationship.103 In addi98. 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974).
99. 483 F.2d at 1105.
100. 5 Bankr. 470 (D. Minn. 1980).
101. No. 18738 (D. Ohio March 14, 1985) (West Law, Ohio library, Case file).
102. See In re Osborne, 42 Bankr. 988, 997 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (to establish a
fiduciary relationship the creditor must exercise almost complete control over the
borrowers operation). See also In re Teletronics Serv., Inc. 29 Bankr. 139, 170
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[i]n the rare circumstance where a creditor exercises such control
over the decision-making processes of the debtor as amounts to a domination of its
will, he may be held accountable for his actions under a fiduciary standard").
103. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust, 757 F.2d 752, 759-63 (6th Cir.
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tion, these new theories are also inadequate since they are either too
vague for individual case application or too limited to provide any
guidance as to how to handle the problem in a systematic and uniform
way in all cases. 104
Indeed, one commentary has noted that
[t]he continued existence of a viable commercial society depends, at least in part, on the ability of business enterprises
to structure their operations and plan for the future. Planning
requires an evaluation of the opportunities and risks associated
with the known and unknown. Unpredictable legal liability
complicates planning by enhancing the risks and expanding
the unknowns in the legal environment of business. In commercial affairs legal liability must be based upon known,

objective standards.

.... 105

What is needed is a defined legal relationship that will sufficiently
balance the interests of both parties under the workout agreement.
This Comment suggests that the imposition of a fiduciary relationship
at the onset of lender control would sufficiently balance the interests
of both parties. Creating such a relationship from the beginning will
provide a workable framework from which both parties can operate.
IV.

COMMON LAW FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

This section will begin with a basic discussion of the common
law fiduciary relationship and end with how the courts are applying
this same concept in other contexts. Finally this comment will show
why this common law fiduciary relationship should be imposed upon
parties at the inception of control under the workout agreement.
When a debtor gets into financial trouble, one would naturally
expect a lender to attempt to protect its investment. However, in the
process of working with the debtor to solve the debtor's financial
problems, the lender occasionally exercises excessive control over
management, or unreasonably interferes with the debtor's business
operations. °0 The legal significance of this control is that it may
1985); Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984);
Dennis v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank, No. 18738 (D. Ohio March 14, 1985) (West Law,
Ohio library, Cases file).
104. See supra notes 36-101 and accompanying text.
105. Ebke & Griffen, supra note 18, at 800.

106. See generally, Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor's Liabilities Resulting from Improper Interference With the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus.
LAW. 343 (1975); Bartlett & Lapatin, The Status of a Creditor as a "Controlling
Person", 28 MERCER L. REv. 639 (1977).
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change the relationship of the lender and its borrower to that of a
fiduciary one and its accompanying obligations." 7
As a general rule, there is "nothing inherent in business dealings

between a lender and a borrower from which a cognizable fiduciary

relationship springs, absent facts and circumstances from which such
a connection may be inferred."'0 However, if the lender exercises a
degree of control over the decision making process of the debtor that
amounts to a domination of the debtor's will, the lender may be held
accountable for its actions under a fiduciary standard.' 9 Just as a
fiduciary relationship is presumed between an attorney-client and
agent-principal," ° so should such a relationship exist, as a matter of
law, between a lender and a debtor who have entered into a controlrelated workout agreement.
The burden of pleading and proving the existence of a fiduciary

relationship is generally imposed upon the party seeking relief.", The
party seeking to establish a fiduciary relationship in the lender-debtor

context is usually the debtor. The debtor must show that he placed

trust and confidence in the lender so that the lender gained influence
and superiority over the debtor, or that due to the workout agreement
2
the lender has control over the debtor's activities."
107. See Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 106, at 347.
108. See also Farmer City State Bank v. Guingrich, 139 Ill. App. 3d 416, 424,
487 N.E.2d 758, 764 (4th Dist. 1985) (plaintiff bank brought suit to enforce a loan
guarantee agreement and defendant plead defense of fraud. Held on that issue that
a fiduciary relationship does not exist as a matter of law between guarantor and a
creditor); Bank Computer Network Corp. v. Continental Nat'l Bank and Trust Co.
of Chicago, 110 Ill. App. 3d 492, 503, 442 N.E.2d 586, 594 (1st Dist. 1982) (corporate
customer brought suit claiming that bank and one of its vice-presidents improperly
set off funds in customer's checking account against debt owed by customer on two
promissory notes); McErlean v. Union Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 90 11.App. 3d 1141,
1148-49, 414 N.E.2d 128, 134 (1st Dist. 1980) (borrower brought action against lender
for breach of oral and written contracts to extend line of credit and for breach of
fiduciary relationship).
109. See supra note 108. For other relevant factors see Verbaere v. Community
Bank of Homewood-Flossmore, 148 Ill. App. 3d 249, 256, 498 N.E.2d 843, 848 (1st
Dist. 1986).
110. McErlean, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 1148, 414 N.E.2d at 414; Farmer City, 139
Ill. App. 3d at 422, 487 N.E.2d at 762-63.
111. Apple v. Apple, 407 Ill. 464, 469, 95 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1950) (initial burden
of proof is on the party seeking relief to show existence of a fiduciary relationship).
See also Farmer City, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 424, 487 N.E.2d at 763; Dewitt County
App. 3d 11, 27, 469 N.E.2d 689,
Public Bldg. Comm. v. County of Dewitt, 128 11.
700-01 (4th Dist. 1984) (fiduciary relationship exists between governmental employees
and officials and their governmental employers).
112. Verbaere, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 256, 498 N.E.2d at 848; Farmer City, 139 Ill.
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Other control related factors that the courts commonly consider
in determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists in the lender-

debtor workout situation include: (1) the power to control the election
of directors or those performing managerial functiois;" (2) use of
the economic leverage arising from a nervous clause to coerce the
borrower to acquiesce to agreements allowing the lender to exercise
control;" 4 (3) control over finances;" (4) forcing the debtor to obtain
a consultant of the bank's choice to help run the debtor's operations,
thereby once again establishing a control relationship;" 6 and (5) physical
7
possession of debtor's assets."
A plaintiff who properly and successfully establishes a fiduciary

relationship between itself and a bank may exercise greater latitude in
the assertion of its claim. In such a situation, the lender, in whom
the debtor has reposed his confidence, is bound in equity and good
conscience to act in good faith and with due regard to the interest of
the debtor."18 "Not honesty alone, but the punctillio of an honor
most sensitive", then becomes the standard for behavior on the part
of the fiduciary. ,9
Many of the same principles (or at least underlying values) which
apply to the fiduciary relationship have been utilized in other contexts.
In State Nat'I Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Company,' 20 the court

held that a borrower is entitled to have its affairs managed by

App. 3d at 424, 487 N.E.2d at 763; Bank Computer, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 503, 442
N.E.2d at 594; Ray v. Winter, 67 Il. 2d 296, 367 N.E.2d 678 (1977) (normally, proof
of a confidential or fiduciary relationship requires a showing that one person has
reposed trust and confidence in another who thereby gains a resulting influence or
superiority over the other).
113 State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.
1984).
e'4. Farah, 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984); In re American Lumber
Co., 5 Bankr. 470 (D. Minn. 1980). See also Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 105.
115. In Re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470 (D. Minn. 1980); Krivo Indus.
Supply Co. v; National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973).
116. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.
1984).
117. In Re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F.Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964), rev'd
on jur. grds., 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967); In Re
American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470 (D. Minn. 1980). See also AmmsRcAN BAR
ASSOCIATION DIVISION FOR PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, Impact of Common Law Theories on Creditor Recovery and Liability, in 1 EMERONo TI-uoRms oF LENDER

Lsmxrm 8, 14-17 (H. Chaitman ed. 1985).
118. BALLNrnNs LAW DICTIONARY 469 (3d ed. 1969).
119. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545-46 (1928).
120. Farah, 678 S.W.2d 661 (rex. Civ. App. 1984).
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competent directors and officers who would maintain a high degree
of loyalty to the company. 21 This was, in effect, a recognition of the
fact that a borrower's interests under a workout agreement must also
be taken into consideration. In K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust
Co., 2 2 the court held that the standard of good faith and fair dealing,
as applied to the lender-debtor relationship, required the lender to
take into consideration the borrower's rights under the loan agreement
before it called the loan due. This requires the lender, once again, to
consider the effect of its actions on the borrower. The prima facie
tort theory, as applied by the Missouri courts, 23 requires the lender
to refrain from any intentional acts arising from a wrongful motive
which may injure the debtor's interest. And finally, the Dennis v.
BancOhio line of cases'2 show the court's willingness to impose a
"fiduciary-like" relationship on the lender who has exerted too much
influence and control over the borrower. The courts' willingness to
recognize this relationship reinforces this comment's recommended
solution to the problems inherent in the lender-debtor workout agreement situation. By recognizing that principles very similar to those of
the fiduciary relationship are being applied in other contexts, one can
see that the courts are willing to adhere to the basic values that
underlie the foundation of this fiduciary relationship.
The problem with both the common law application and these
present day analogies, however, is that they are all centered on judicial
determinations of whether too much influence and control have been
exerted. When put in simple terms the courts, in effect, will only
impose a fiduciary obligation on a party who has exerted too much
influence and control over another. Based on the current standards,
however, it is difficult to tell in advance how much control is too
much. What one court considers excessive, another may consider
prudent and proper. 25 From this standpoint, it can be seen why
121. Id. at 690.
122. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
123. See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
125. E.g., compare Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir. 1973), reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.
1974) (where the court required "actual participatory, total control of the debtor")
and Bank Computer Network Corp. v. Continental Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 110 I11.App. 3d 492, 442 N.E.2d 586 (1st Dist. 1982) (fiduciary duty is
created only when one party entrusts himself to the domination and control of
another) with In Re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470 (D. Minn. 1980) (which
held that the bank assumed a fiduciary obligation when they took possession of the
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lending institutions get themselves into trouble without realizing it.
If, however, the parties were to utilize a system that provided guidance
and uniformity in this confusing state of the law, both the banks and
the borrowers would be able to take a more practical and realistic
approach to their problems. This is precisely what this comment
suggests that the courts do. The comment now turns its attention to
this new approach.

V.

A

RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVE:
TEST

A

CONTROL-RELATED DUTY

When parties enter into a workout agreement, it is difficult to
tell what their respective rights and duties are under the agreement.
What may have been thought to be acceptable conduct on the part
of the bank may now be tantamount to control-in-fact and resulting
liability. The courts' present attempts to deal with this problem are
seemingly futile as they only provide an after-the-fact analysis. A
solution to this confusing state of the law would be to impose a
fiduciary relationship on the parties at the inception of the control
relationship.
Notwithstanding the general rule that the conventional lenderdebtor relationship does not impose a fiduciary duty upon the bank,
it has been held that certain other bank-customer relations may
establish a fiduciary relationship. i26These bank-customer relationships
have been characterized by the courts "as relationships going beyond
the conventional lender-debtor relationship, or as relationships of
trust and confidence. ' 127 In these instances, a fiduciary duty may be
imposed upon a bank even though the parties thought they were
conducting transactions at arms length.1 28 The lender-debtor relationship under the workout agreement should also be recognized as one
of these relationships and as such should also require the imposition
of fiduciary principles.
Indeed, this fiduciary relationship is already being recognized in
a very similar setting. Under a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding the
court has the discretion to appoint a trustee to oversee the business
debtor's plant and exercised full control over its cash disbursements) and Dennis v.
BancOhio Nat'l Bank, No. 18758 (D. Ohio March 14, 1985) (West Law, Ohio library,
Case file) (where the court held that the bank assumed a fiduciary relationship when
it began to advise the Dennis family on how to run their farm).
126. See generally, Annotation, Broad View that Conventional Bank-Depositor
RelationshipDoes Not Impose FiduciaryDuty, 70 A.L.R.3d 1350 (1976).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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In fact, until recently this was done as a matter of

This trustee is held to a fiduciary duty with the resulting
course.
consequence that the trustee, in trying to assure creditor repayment,
3
must also look out for the debtor's best interests. ' When parties
enter into a workout agreement, the lender assumes a role analogous
to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee. The only difference is that under
the workout agreement the bank voluntarily assumes the controlling

position. As such, the judicial recognition of the duties accompanying

the Chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee should also apply to the lender
under a workout agreement.
Under the normal lender-debtor relationship, a bank loans money
32
The
to a borrower on the condition of repayment with interest.
expectations and rights of the parties are simple. The lender expects
and has a right to repayment while the borrower expects to have the
right to use the money as long as he makes good on his obligation to
the bank.'3 3 When the parties enter into a workout agreement, however, this presents a whole different set of circumstances. The borrower is no longer the same borrower that originally walked into the
3 4
lender's door; the borrower is now likely in serious financial trouble.
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 151104 (1985).
130. Section 151104 seems to modify § 1104 by permitting the United States
trustee, as well as a party in interest to make a request. See HERzos & KING,
BANKRUPTCY CODE, Pt. 1, § 151104, at 734 (1984). "The norm, under § 1104, is to
leave the debtor in possession unless a party in interest requests appointment of a
trustee or examiner. Upon such request, after notice and hearing the court shall
appoint a trustee if one of two conditions exist: (1) fraud, dishonesty, incompetence
or gross mismanagement, or (2) a trustee would be in the best interests of creditors,
and equity security holders, and other interests, regardless of number of holders of
securities or the amounts of assets or liabilities. This section allows much more
flexibility in the appointment of a trustee in a reorganization case than under Chapter
X of the act. In a Chapter X case, a trustee was usually the norm because appointment
was mandated where the liabilities were $250,000 or more. In Chapters XI and XII
a receiver (Chapter XI) and a trustee (Chapter XII) was appointed only when
necessary. Thus under § 1104, even in a large case that under the Act would have
required the Chapter X machinery, the debtor may be left in possession, resulting in,
inter alia, economy in the administration costs." Id. at 518.
131. See, e.g., In re Texaco Inc., Nos. 87 B 20142, 87 B 20143, 87 B 20144
(S.D.N.Y. March 23, 1988) (LEXIS, Bankruptcy library, Cases file); In re George
and Kornelia Banholmi, No. 83 B 7160 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1988) (LEXIS, Bankruptcy
library, Cases file).
132. Id.
133. See generally Bartlett & Lapatain, The Status of a Creditoras a "Controlling Person," 28 MERCER L. REv. 639, 651 (1977).

134. See, e.g., Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship With

its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 523, 549 (1984); Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 3.
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While the agreement is intended to benefit both parties, the lender is
in a more advantageous position over the borrower. By advising the
financially troubled debtor on its business affairs, the bank initiates
a relationship wherein it has the capability of exerting superior control
or influence over the debtor. Indeed, this modified agreement is
usually presented to a borrower as an alternative to acceleration of
the loan and as such, the borrower has a choice of either acquiescing
or facing bankruptcy proceedings.' 35 This results in parties of unequal
bargaining power dealing in a serious financial transaction. The
lender, who has the power to force the debtor in'o possible bankruptcy, may be able to get the debtor to agree to al nost anything at
this point. 3 6 Thus, the ordinary lender-debtor relationship has taken
on a whole new perspective. It is now one in which the lender has the
ability to, and often does, exert control over the borrower's daily
affairs. It is at this precise point that the lender leaves the realm of
the ordinary lender-debtor relationship and should be held to have
entered into the "fiduciary zone".
"Present day commercial transactions are not, as in the past,
primarily for cash; rather, modern day banking practices involve
highly complicated structures of credit and other complexities. '' 1
These "[oiften thrust a bank into the role of an advisor thereby
creating a relationship of trust or confidence which may result in a
fiduciary duty being imposed upon the bank when dealing with its
customer."'13 8 Indeed, when a lender enters into a workout agreement
with its debtor, this is precisely the role it assumes. The justification
for such a proposition lies in the very nature of a workout agreement
wherein the lender assumes a control-related position. The lender
typically requires prior approval for all transactions and may at times
go so far as to require the debtor to hire a bank-chosen consultant to
advise the borrower on its business affairs. 3 9 Because the banks in
effect "manage or have some control over very substantial property
135. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 4-8. See also PRACTISING LAW
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WORKOUTS 429 (1987).
136. See generally Lundgren, supra note 134.
137. Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 33 Wash. App. 456, 462, 656
P.2d 1089, 1092 (3 Div. 1983) (citing, Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34,
39, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (1937)). See also, Hutson v. Wenatchee Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n., 22 Wash. App. 91, 95, 88 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1978).
138. See supra note 137.
139. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 34. See also Bartlett & Lapatain,
supra note 132; State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 668 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1984).
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interests of debtors they have the potential power to inflict great
losses on these property owners."' 14 In addition, when a lender feels
that its debtor is in serious financial trouble, i.e., the lender feels
insecure, it basically has two viable options: (1) it may exercise its
rights under the loan agreement and call the loan due and payable;
or, (2) it may choose to enter into a workout agreement with its
borrower. 1 4' Under either option, the bank will be entitled to full
compensation for the loan. 42 However, if the lender should choose
the latter option, which involves the lender in the role of advisor or
controller/manager, it should also accept the responsibilities that come
with it.
"[Tihe banking industry, like anyone else dealing in the business
world, ought to be held to a standard of reasonableness."' ' 43 When a
bank, in the context of a workout agreement, begins to advise a
borrower on how to run its business, and the debtor's business loses
money as a result, that bank ought to be responsible for the loss.'"
Under these circumstances, it is not only just, but also reasonable for
the lender to exercise its judgment in the best interests of the borrower. 41 The reason for holding the lender to such a duty is that the
lender has precluded the debtor from relying upon its own best
judgment, and thus has forced the debtor to rely upon the lender's
judgment as to its business affairs.
This approach may be perceived as producing some chilling
effects on bank lending policies. Although, the lender, who has the
choice to either accelerate the loan or enter into a workout agreement
may opt to accelerate for fear that a fiduciary duty is too great a
burden, such a result is not only unwarranted, but also unnecessary.
By imposing a fiduciary relationship on the lender at the onset of the
workout agreement, the bank may be forced to exercise better judgment as to its actions, but it certainly is not put into an uncompromising position. After all, the primary purpose for entering into a
workout agreement is to maintain the debtor's financial solvency in
order to assure repayment of the loan. By looking out for the debtor's
best interests, the bank will add to the possibility of repayment
140. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Struc-

ture, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 738, 758 (1978).
141. Id.

142. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 4-8.
143. Moss, Borrowers Fight Back With Lender Liability, 73 A.B.A.J. 64, 68
(March 1, 1987) quoting J. Stephen Teetor, Attorney-at-Law.
144. Id.
145. Id. See also Lundgren, supra note 134, at 551.

1988:505]

WORK-OUT AGREEMENTS

through the promotion of more profitable business operations. 46 If
however, the bank should feel that debtor's chances for success are
slim, then acceleration may be in the best interests of both parties. 147
The continuance of a troubled business will only increase the losses
of the debtor and decrease the chance of creditor repayment. The
longer the debtor is financially stable, the greater likelihood the bank
will receive full payment. 148 If however, the lender through mismanagement or unwarranted liquidation should run the borrower out of
business, the lender may face the risk of subordination or costly
lawsuits.
"Because of the disadvantages of the developing liability system,
banks and other lending institutions, their customers and debtors, as
well as judges and lawyers, need to reorient their thinking, re-evaluate
their conduct, and re-conceptualize their objectives and strategies. '149
By recognizing this expanded fiduciary relationship the courts will
provide uniformity to this ever expanding and increasingly troubled
field of law. Such a well recognized and easily applied principle of
law allows both parties to know what their rights and obligations
under the work-out agreement are at the onset of the relationship. In
addition, this approach will also promote judicial efficiency and
economy as the courts will no longer be forced to make their way
through the multi-faceted allegations of the litigants trying to utilize
the former approaches, which, as pointed out, provide merely an
after-the-fact analysis of the party's misdoings.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Lender liability has emerged from a body of law based on
traditional common law theories of liability to one presently struggling
to create new theories that not only provide more protection to the
debtor but also more uniformity to this troubled field of law.s° What
the courts are in effect doing is trying to draw a line between the
lenders' interest in assuring repayment, and the debtors' interest in
freedom from undue interference by the creditor. What is needed is
a defined legal relationship that will sufficiently balance the interests
of both parties under the workout agreement. This will allow for the
uniformity necessary for parties to conduct their business transactions
146. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 5-6.
147. Id. at 4-8.
148. Id. at 4-5.

149. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 18, at 813.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.

530

[Vol. 8

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

with some degree of certainty. This comment suggests that the imposition of a fiduciary relationship which will begin to operate at the
inception of the control relationship under the workout agreement
will more than adequately accomplish this goal.
By utilizing a theory of liability which is both recognizable and
easily applicable the parties will know what their duties and obligations
are at the onset of the relationship and as such they will be able to
plan accordingly. By providing stricter guidelines and ensuring that
both the banks and other interested parties are acting in a responsible
manner, it is hoped that the banking industry as a whole will profit.
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